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INTRODUCTION 
More than ten years ago, in late April 1975, Saigon was the scene of 
jarring and contrasting images that spelled the end of a long war. On April 
30 three North Vietnamese tanks slammed through the gates of the Presi-
dential Palace and Hanoi's flag flew on the courtyard flagpole, while the 
day before "Huey" helicopters plucked the final line of American refugees 
from the rooftop of the U.S. Embassy in "Operation Frequent Wind." 
Seeing the newsclips of this last evacuation, President Gerald Ford 
remarked to an aide, "It's over. Let's put it behind us."1 
Whatever else Americans have done with Vietnam, they have cer-
tainly not put it behind them. Everywhere in the Third World where the 
remotest prospect for American intervention in some local contretemps 
looms, the ghost of Vietnam again casts a shadow. Currently, the "lessons" 
of Vietnam are invoked by both sides to the debate over the proper extent 
of American involvement in El Salvador and over the propriety of aid to 
the contras in Nicaragua.2 In the 1984 presidential campaign, President 
Reagan defiantly called the contras of Nicaragua "freedom fighters". 
Painfully aware of the possibility of another Vietnam in Central America, 
his Democratic challengers worried over American involvement. Walter 
Mondale, though not as confident about the region's prospects, worried 
about the consequences of "pulling the plug" on yet another friend — El 
Salvador. Gary Hart fretted over the spectre of American blood being 
spilled in a new conflict. In a reflective mood after the campaign, former 
U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said in an interview that "the U.S. 
should never have gotten into the Vietnam War 'in the first place'," and, as 
a result of this debilitating legacy, America should commit military force to 
Central America only "as a last resort."3 Indeed, Defense Secretary Caspar 
Weinberger, in outlining six tests for the future commitment of U.S. 
military force, specifically invoked the lessons of Vietnam to reassure the 
nation that it would not be "dragged into a quagmire in Central America."4 
People draw their lessons from their memories, from a set of images. 
Some, with Ronald Reagan, remember Vietnam as a "noble crusade," 
while others relive with Daniel Ellsberg his nightmare of the war as a 
heinous "crime."5 Despite the elusiveness of the 'truth' of the Vietnam 
experience, discovering that truth remains an important task if any coher-
ent, useful lessons are to emerge from these memories and that experience. 
HISTORICAL LESSONS 
The war can be most clearly understood if it is seen as having been 
fought at two levels. On one level, it was an international struggle between 
the American foreign policy of containment and the communist strategy of 
people's war. On another plane, it was a national struggle in Vietnam 
between Communists and "Nationalists" (for lack of a better word for the 
likes of Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu) for the mantle of legiti-
18 
Conflict Quarterly 
macy.6 The two struggles never truly fit together well, but they were both 
always there. In part, the clash of people's images, memories, and lessons 
stems from this frustrating antinomy. 
For Americans, it was the international struggle that brought the U.S. 
to Vietnam and it is questions emanating from the international level, as 
the U.S. continues to attempt to recapture a coherent global foreign policy, 
that compels America to sift through the wreckage for the 'lessons' of 
Vietnam. There are two points of focus: first, there emerges a philosophical 
question and second, an instrumental question. Philosophically, are Marx-
ist, people's wars, or, more generally, communist-supported insurgencies, a 
threat to American foreign policy interests? To answer this, one must 
consider the international view of the world and what role America envi-
sions for itself in this world. America's role had been clear — it had a 
Containment Doctrine up until the time it slammed into the hard wall of 
Vietnam, or, as some would prefer, fell into a quagmire. If America needs 
to be concerned about the outcomes to these insurgencies, what is the 
optimal level of Western intervention necessary to prevent the success of 
Marxist, people's wars? Answering this question lands one squarely in the 
local context in which the insurgency is being fought out. This context is 
best understood as the struggle for legitimacy between the domestic insur-
gents and incumbents. Bard O'Neill, for one, supports this contention by 
opening his book, Insurgency in the Modern World, with the assertion that 
"insurgency is essentially a political legitimacy crisis of some sort."7 
In coming to terms with this larger question of the lessons of Vietnam 
one should perhaps answer the instrumental question first, to determine if 
Western interventions in behalf of an insurgency-ridden ally are feasible 
and useful at all, before considering the philosophical (or international 
level) question of intervention as a normative value of foreign policy 
objective. While conceding that this philosophical question is ultimately 
the more important of the two, it is the instrumental question, in the 
author's opinion, which must be answered first. Without knowing whether, 
or under what conditions, an intervention could be successful, the debate 
over the philosophical question is abstract, charged with moral rhetoric 
and posturing, and basically groundless. 
This article will be confined to the instrumental question and to 
presentation of an analytical framework or model oflegitimacy, which the 
author considers the central issue of an insurgency. The explication of this 
framework is but a part of the larger process of drawing lessons from 
history. According to E. H. Carr, the first task in drawing lessons from 
history is the interpretation of the event under investigation from a clearly 
defined vantage point.8 Elucidation of this vantage point allows the con-
text of one event to be compared with the context of another. In this way, 
Carr avers, one can discern "what is general in the unique."9 This is the 
process the author attempts to use with regard to the Vietnam war, gaining 
a "vantage point," a perspective on which to base research questions. The 
process of drawing lessons by relating one context to another and thereby 
determining what is relevant to a lesson, and what is not, W. H. Walsh calls 
"colligation."10 
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Ernest May has added an important refinement to this process by 
insisting that historical lessons are properly drawn only from comparing 
one component of an event to a similar component in another event, not 
from applications of an entire event wholesale." No victory is ever total, 
nor is every loss final. Even in victory there are things done wrong and 
stupidly, and in defeat there are yet deeds of intelligence and glowing 
success. Hence, the lessons from any conflict do not derive from the 
general outcome of success or failure, but from the constitutive compo-
nents of the victory or the defeat. The German blitzkrieg was not the origin 
of the German defeat in World War II, nor was people's war the strategy by 
which the Vietnamese Communists came to power in 1975.12 These "facts" 
may make no difference to the Vietnamese and Germans of today, but they 
do to the Salvadoran guerrilla commandante who may think that "history" 
is on his side because he is following a people's war strategy which had 
"soundly defeated" the Americans in Vietnam a decade earlier. 
In pursuing this process of colligation, Robert Jervis contributes the 
further insight that a candidate lesson can be established only after passing 
it through an array of competing analogies or cases to see if it retains 
validity.13 An examination of the single case of Vietnam may suggest that if 
a Western intervention in support of an incumbent regime escalates to the 
point of introducing ground combat troops, the intervention has gone too 
far because the undermining of the local regime's legitimacy becomes 
irreparable with the massive presence of foreign troops. From this, the 
lesson to the Reagan administration in El Salvador from the single case of 
Vietnam would indicate the efficacy in not going beyond the current 
"Advisor War." Examining an array of competing cases, however, one 
finds that this thesis is not always proven. In other cases of Western 
intervention in Marxist, people's wars, one finds it valid for the earlier 
French intervention in Indochina, but not for the insurgencies in Malaya 
and Greece, where, in both cases, large numbers of British soldiers inter-
vened in support of the incumbent regimes with no cost to the regime's 
legitimacy. With the addition of an array of competing but similar cases, 
the lesson for the Reagan administration in El Salvador is no longer quite 
as clear as it was from the single case of Vietnam. 
The method of "colligation" in deriving the lessons of Vietnam 
involves several steps. First, in answering the instrumental question "What 
is the optimal level of Western intervention, if any, in Marxist, people's 
wars?", the thesis is advanced that insurgencies are manifestations of 
legitimacy crises. The focal point then, in sifting through the debris of the 
Vietnam experience for lessons, is the issue of legitimacy. Second, to 
determine "the generalizable from the unique" in this investigation, an 
analytical framework of legitimacy is developed that divides this political 
objective into component parts and levels. The framework, with its set of 
questions, and attendant structure and common variables flowing from it, 
can then be superimposed on other cases. Third, the framework is used to 
analyze the case of Vietnam for a provisional answer to the instrumental 
question. To provide the array of similar cases suggested by Jervis for 
comparative lessons, the war in Vietnam is placed in a class of events that 
might be categorized as 'Western Interventions in Marxist People's Wars.' 
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The fourth step, then, is to use the framework of legitimacy to perform 
analyses on interventions similar to that in Vietnam: Mao's "long march" 
to power in China (1920-1949), the three rounds of the Greek civil war 
(1941-1949), the campaign against the Huks in the Philippines (1946-
1956), the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the history of the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia ( 1967-1975), and the pursuit of power by the Pathet 
Lao in Laos ( 1955-1975). More definitive answers to the initial instrumen-
tal question are offered. Finally, the implications drawn from these lessons 
can suggest answers to the more important philosophic question, "Should 
Western powers intervene in Marxist people's wars?" While operating 
within the context of this scheme, the present article will be confined to 
discussion of the first two steps: the determination of insurgence, as 
legitimacy crises, and the presentation of the devised analytical framework 
of legitimacy. 
INSURGENCIES AS LEGITIMACY CRISES 
Put simply, legitimacy means "rightful rule." Any social system main-
tains itself by having one group, class, or sector of the society possess a 
sufficient concentration of power to control and guarantee the functioning 
of the society as a whole. In the context of each of these social systems, 
societies, or states, this concentration of power requires justification. The 
relative success of this power-wielding group's justification is its degree of 
legitimacy. In Eqbal Ahmad's words, legitimacy is "that crucial and ubiq-
uitous factor in politics which invests power with authority."14 Thus, to 
such social scientists as Harry Eckstein, "The issue of support and opposi-
tion, legitimacy and illegitimacy, stands at the crux of all political study."15 
Every government or political regime lives on a grant of legitimacy from its 
populace. Without such a grant, an incumbent regime either freezes into a 
rigid totalitarianism, or rots in corruption and incompetence. Usually and 
eventually as a result, it faces a challenge to its rule, through a coup d'état, 
revolutionary insurrection, or festering insurgency. Insurgencies stand out 
from their counterparts' immediacy and surprise by being revolutions "on 
the slow burn," feeding gradually on their incumbent regimes' illegitimacy. 
Insurgencies have almost come to be a characteristic of the process of 
development or modernization in the so-called Third World. Orthodox 
economic theorists like Albert O. Hirschman describe economic growth as 
being, inevitably, an imbalanced process which results in frequent bottle-
necks as the pendulum swings between forward and backward linkages, 
striving for balance and stability.16 In many ways, insurgencies occur as a 
result of imbalances in the process of political development and impede 
further political progress. Either the regime will break through the political 
and military challenge represented by the insurgents, thereby reestablish-
ing its legitimacy, and move on, or it will eventually be overwhelmed by the 
insurgents who have to establish their own justification for rule (legiti-
macy) and themselves move on to the next challenge. In any insurgency, 
the period in the middle (the bottleneck) when it is unclear whose claim to, 
and brand of, legitimacy will triumph can seem to be an endless and 
hopeless interregnum. 
A difficult concept and goal in the best of circumstances, legitimacy is 
particularly elusive in an insurgency where at least two sides try to establish 
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their own vision of legitimate rule. The government has to defend both its 
vision of, and its performance of, legitimacy while the insurgents seek only 
to destroy the government's capability to perform. They, in turn, often 
have a vision which is vague, lacks authenticity in the culture, or is better 
hidden. Marxism-Leninism, after all, is a European import saddled with 
such unpalatable tenets as atheism and agricultural collectivization. Buf-
feted by these two forces, an insurgency becomes a legitimacy crisis, in 
regard to what legitimacy is and to the possessor of its mantle. 
Especially in a crisis, but more generally as well, legitimacy has many 
facets. As Max Weber once put it, "compliance with authority is almost 
invariably determined by a combination of motives."17 Regardless of the 
combination of motives, authority has to justify itself at three levels of 
legitimacy: at the level of the social system and of social values, at the level 
of the regime that upholds this system, and at the level of the efficacy of the 
regime's particular policies. A "legitimate authority" or regime is basically 
judged or indicated by three sets of corresponding questions. Is the regime 
adhering to agreed upon moral principles of fairness and justice? Is the 
regime duly constituted and performing its functions? Is the regime effec-
tive in its performance and fair in its particular policies? Answering these 
questions defines the dynamic process of legitimation. Legitimacy crises 
come in two degrees of severity: the first occurring if the answer to any of 
the questions is no, and the second, more serious crisis, if the terms of the 
questions themselves are in dispute. An insurgency is clearly a legitimacy 
crisis of the second degree. 
LEGITIMACY FRAMEWORK: FIRST CUT 
The author's analytical framework of legitimacy can be best under-
stood if it is presented in two cuts: first, as a general overview of the 
struggle itself and then as a more detailed introduction to the types of 
legitimacy goals and issues or variables involved. 
In an insurgency, two sides, the incumbents and the insurgents, strug-
gle for the prize or goal of legitimacy. They struggle partly between 
themselves over who should possess this mantle, but they both also strug-
gle with the concept and goal itself, trying to meet exacting standards 
especially those accepted by the populace. An insurgency, seen as a legiti-
macy struggle, is a race up a mountain by the two claimants making 
appeals on three levels (or types of calculation) for the support of the 
people. 
The most basic calculation or level of support is that of interest. Here 
the individuals and the masses move with the prevailing winds. They 
calculate their personal security to blend in and become inconspicuous to 
both sides. At this level, they take personal advantage of those programs 
and policies that benefit them, and grumble about those that do not. This 
"legitimacy" of interest, at best, offers passive support to the contending 
sides. 
A second or intermediate level of support is that of opportunity. Here 
some individuals and some groups calculate that real advantage can be had 
by actively joining one side or another, whether for the opportunity of 
command and influence with the insurgents or riches and prestige with the 
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incumbent regime. Calculation at this level requires an active commitment 
to the side of choice and produces the tier of cadre leaders so vital to any 
side's quest for legitimation. This is basically the level at which organiza-
tion and mobilization take place. 
Finally, at the summit, there is the consideration of ideology or belief, 
having moved from calculation of individual interest and opportunity to a 
calculation that sublimates these individual concerns to a largely selfless 
devotion to "the cause." Few in a society, on either side, will rise to this level 
of support but, as Andrew Molnar points out, an insurgency gains staying 
power only insofar as it is able to transform its earlier, cadre level, motiva-
tion of opportunity to commitment, for a fair percentage of these stal-
warts, to its cause and ideology.18 The requisite of a core number of "true 
believers," applies equally to the incumbent regime. 
An insurgency and reacting counterinsurgency, then, is a struggle for a 
working minority, a "steel frame," of true believers. This working minority 
believes in the legitimacy of their side, ensuring an organization that offers 
enough opportunities to enlist active commitments toward sustaining its 
activities as well as ensuring an acquiescent majority whose calculations at 
least will not hinder the respective campaigns for legitimacy. 
LEGITIMACY MODEL: SECOND CUT 
There is, generally, an essential duality to an insurgency. Insurgency, 
as observed above, is a legitimacy crisis "of sorts," but it is also a revolution 
"on the slow burn." The struggle concerns both national legitimacy and 
revoluntary legitimacy. Regarding the quest for national legitimacy, virtu-
ally all theorists of political development characterize developing coun-
tries as transitional societies caught between the persistent hold of tradi-
tion and beckoning of modernity. Fred Riggs calls these transitional 
societies "prismatic," viewing the process of development as movement 
from traditional "fused" societies through the intermediate "prismatic" 
phase to culminate in the modern, fully "diffracted" society. By a "fused" 
society Riggs means a society with essentially one, undifferentiated set of 
values secured by one authority structure. A "diffracted" society, is a 
completely modern society with a set of differentiated and pluralistic 
values, with pluralistic and competitive authority or institutional struc-
tures to match. The intermediate stage, a "prismatic" society, is marked by 
conflicting systems with some values tightly fused and others in the process 
of breaking up.19 Thus, prismatic societies are ones plagued by political 
bottlenecks which provide the fertile social soil for nurturing insurgencies. 
Most early theorists of political development viewed it, as Riggs did, 
as a difficult, turbulent process, but one which, nevertheless, moved in a 
linear direction gradually tracing a path of political reform, economic 
growth, and social progress similar to that undertaken centuries earlier by 
the advanced Western industrial democracies. Samuel Huntington was 
one of the first of these theorists to challenge this confidence in a linear 
path. He warned that although modernity, as a goal, would bring about 
stability, the modernization process itself might instead become derailed 
and lead to decay or even revolution. The key for Huntington in deciding 
the direction of this process lay in how each society resolved the issue of the 
"Green Uprising," the integration of the rural masses into the existing 
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political system rather than the mobilization against it. That rural mobili-
zation held the potential for breaking the political system, Huntington 
shrewdly pointed out, was due to the regime's dilemma in balancing the 
largely traditional aspirations, for example, land reform, of the peasantry 
against the more Western and Utopian values of the urban middle class.20 
The problem faced by Huntington's "Green Uprising" presented the same 
legitimacy crisis mapped out in this framework. 
With this in mind, national legitimacy is divided into the twin calls of 
traditional legitimacy — the continuing operative remnants of a polity's 
pre-modern political culture and institutional structure — and modern 
legitimacy — those orientations and institutions tied to the engine of 
modernization. The quest for national legitimacy presents the challenge of 
steering a passage between these two. The quest for revolutionary legiti-
macy, on the other hand, is troubled at the outset by having to start from 
the context of this national legitimacy struggle even as it seeks to impose an 
entirely new social order on the polity. The dilemma for the revolutionary 
is that he must be true to his vision, and to the strategy devised to achieve it, 
such as people's war, and yet attract people and groups to his banner in the 
context of the existing national culture and its standards of performance 
and legitimacy. 
Taking these two legitimacy goals — national and revolutionary 
—together, one can view the over-arching legitimacy struggle between 
insurgents and incumbents as separating into three types of legitimacy 
appeals targeted on different groups of people and corresponding sets of 
issue fields or variables. The issue fields are not discrete but instead form 
overlapping circles. 
First, there is the legitimacy appeal of ideology or belief. Pre-eminently, 
it is the leadership group of both sides which responds to, and indeed 
shapes, this level of appeal. This is the grand cause of the movement or 
"bandit suppression" campaign. In this group are the charismatic leaders 
and fanatics, Eric Hoffer's "true believer," Buddhist martyrs (Madame 
Nhu's "barbecues"), the sacrificial public servant, and the person exempli-
fied in Bakunin's "Catechism of a Revolutionary." In traditional terms, it is 
the appeal of nationalism and whatever else stimulates societal loyalties, 
illustrated by slogans such as "throw out the foreign devils." In modern 
terms, it is a general appeal to a more "open society" built around such 
concepts as "political participation" and "societal access." In various 
guises, this is the ideology of modern democratic societies. In revolution-
ary terms, it is the high road of strategy and the chance for a glorious 
contribution to the international anti-imperialist struggle. At this level, for 
all appeals, one is speaking individually about the "societal orientations" 
of Harry Eckstein's congruence theory of legitimacy,21 and more generally 
or collectively about the political culture of the much maligned 
structural-functionalists. 
Second, there is the legitimacy appeal of opportunity. The primary 
target of this group is the cadre level for the revolutionaries, and the 
officers, NCO's, and public servants for the incumbents. This is the most 
overlooked level and yet it perhaps is the most vital — at least initially 
—because for both sides this is the level which provides the hard-core 
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activists who man the organizations that breathe life into the ideological 
appeals. At the outset, this group does not respond so much to appeals of 
ideology, nationalism, and the grand cause as much as it does to interme-
diate and group causes that are more pragmatic and relate to the compet-
ing social and economic structures of the two sides. This is close to Max 
Weber's legitimacy of structure or, more currently, to Ron Rogowski's 
"rational legitimacy."22 Seen another way, though the motivation and 
calculations may be individual, the effects are subgroup and national 
because the opportunist is now committed to one or the other of the 
competing structures. He has helped to provide active legitimacy in that, 
for whatever personal reasons, he has offered his general support to the 
incumbent regime or to the insurgent revolutionaries. In traditional terms, 
the evaluative standard is not high-flown appeals of nationalism or com-
munism, but communalism. As Jeffrey Race pointed out, there is an 
overriding salience of this standard of appeal to groups in rural Asia, the 
arena of the "Little Tradition" where insurgencies are fought out.23 
Although there are other indicators, the most important for communal 
legitimacy is land reform. In modern times, this "group," as opposed to 
nation and individual, responds to the programs, policies, and institutions 
that made up "societal access" and "political participation," including 
elections, political parties, land reform, and employment and educational 
opportunities. Therefore, in revolutionary terms, the task at this level is to 
repeat Mao's investigation in his Hunan Report ( 1927)24 and ferret out the 
"objective conditions" that impinge on the social horizons of villagers and 
devise appeals to recruit cadres who join for opportunities of mobility, 
redress of various grievances, and new lives. 
Finally, there is the "legitimacy" appeal of interest. This is the "legiti-
macy" of the masses (as in leaders, cadres, and masses) or, alternatively, of 
the individual (as in nation, group, and individual). This is David Easton's 
legitimacy interest,25 perhaps, or the personal cause of Samuel Popkin's 
"political entrepreneurs."26 The other two legitimacies require active and 
voluntary support for their cause, national or intermediate, but "legiti-
macy" of interest requires only passive support or compliance by the 
masses. It is either bought or coerced from the people in a variety of 
over-lapping traditional, modern and revolutionary ways. The watchword 
here is not nationalism or communalism, but security. This is demon-
strated in ways common to the modernizer and to the revolutionary; 
though, since the modernizer is the incumbent, he is held to standards of 
governmental performance that the revolutionary can evade. Positively, 
both sides can compete through offering various rewards — a better deal in 
a liberated zone, of "Honda economy," as Frances FitzGerald in effect 
called it,27 in government areas. Negatively, of course, both sides can 
punish and force submission through terror and counter-terror. 
Putting it all in a chart, this "of sorts" of the over-arching legitimacy 
struggle between incumbents and insurgents can be portrayed as in Chart 
1. 
Unfortunately, the very presentation of a table like this, while it does 
map out a conceptual framework, also conveys distortionary images. In 
this case it seems to imply that the legitimacy crisis is static and that the 
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categories are discrete, air-tight compartments. A legitimacy crisis, and the 
insurgency that springs from it, is a highly fluid and dynamic phenomenon 
with national and revolutionary legitimacy interacting with each other and 
contesting the three appeals, levels, and various issues in such a blur that, 
at times, the best place to put this chart, in terms of its most accurate 
rendering, is on a pin wheel during a hurricane. 
The appeals, levels and issues of legitimacy need to be properly 
overlapped as well. For example, while generally it is the leaders that 
concern themselves with ideology, some peasants may respond to this 
appeal. Conversely, no matter how fanatic a leader's devotion to his cause, 
he is certainly not immune to calculations of his own individual interest. 
Finally, one does not wish to suggest, as the chart may, a sharp 
distinction between individual and group or collective motivations and 
decision-making calculations. In the author's view, individuals reach their 
decisions on what is rational and what is right for them on the basis of both 
individual and collective factors. It is hoped the two will converge, but 
occasionally they do not. This divergence constitutes a moral crisis and 
raises an individual's horizons above the legitimacy of interest to that of 
opportunity and ideology. The collective factors are both the institutional 
structures that define and confine his environment and the cultural orien-
tations that circumscribe his intellectual horizon or paradigm. No matter 
how rational a peasant, as an individual, may be in the calculations of his 
interest, the structure may not let him choose his best interest and his 
political culture may not allow him, intellectually, to see it. On the other 
hand, no matter how ripe a particular society may be for a revolution or 
insurgency, in terms of whatever indicators are set as the diagnostic signs, if 
no leaders step forward as individuals and set up an appropriate organiza-
tion to channel this insurgent sentiment, the revolution or insurgency will 
still not break out.28 This actually is nothing more than a restatement of the 
great mystery from Plato's "Myth of the Cave" — what makes the future 
philosopher (or future insurgent leader) turn his head toward the light in 
the first place? 
EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY 
Having presented the domestic dynamics that comprise the struggle 
between incumbents and insurgents for the mantle of legitimacy, one must 
also observe that within internal society, where every state, and frequently 
individual, takes an abiding interest, in the actions of others, seldom is one 
allowed to have a civil war or insurgency in isolation. Thus there is a fourth 
legitimacy, an external legitimacy that interacts with the three domestic 
ones. Foreign intervention, whether on the side of the incumbent or of the 
insurgent, raises the stakes of the struggle, and fundamentally alters it, in at 
least three ways. Most obviously, and most crucially in terms of the 
immediate arena of the struggle, there is the impact of the intervention on 
each of the various domestic legitimacies. This impact on domestic legiti-
macy is the key factor in a judgement call on whether, and at what level, one 
intervenes in an insurgency. For a potential intervenor, it is important to 
understand that legitimacy struggles are fought over battles that ultimately 
win the peace. Just winning the war, in purely military terms, may not be 
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enough and, often, may be a mistake or may deflect one from grasping the 
prize of legitimacy itself. This was the essence of Chinese Defense Minister 
Lin Piao's classic warning to his Vietnamese communist comrades to rely 
ultimately on themselves because no victory can be consolidated if it is won 
by compromised methods.29 
An external intervention also affects the legitimacy of the intervenor's 
role in the international system. Due to the lack of uniform norms and 
institutional authority, that is, a world government, in the international 
system, this effect on systematic legitimacy may be rather weak, but 
Hedley Bull makes it clear that there are certain minimal standards of 
legitimacy or behavior expectations that come with great power and 
superpower status. To ignore these standards, Bull argues, will eventually 
entail real costs to the violator's foreign policy and basic international 
role.30 Thus an intervention must be "right" internationally as well, or at 
least not be too blatantly "wrong." 
The third legitimacy effect of an external intervention might be called 
a 'sleeper.' Sleep, unfortunately, does not last forever and the sleeper 
usually awakens at the cruellest of times during a long-sputtering insur-
gency. In the case of Vietnam, this sleeper — the impact of the intervention 
on the domestic legitimacy of the intervening state — awoke in the middle 
of the Tet Offensive. At some point, the domestic legitimacy and politics of 
the intervenor and "intervenee" become intertwined. Thus, currently in 
relation to El Salvador, one may see Roberto d'Aubuisson picnicking with 
Senator Jesse Helms, and Senator Helms, in turn, being villified for his 
action in a recent Senatorial campaign. Meanwhile, Jose Napoleon Duarte 
alternatively rallied around the highways and byways of El Salvador and 
then came to Washington to "Meet the Press" and lobby in the corridors of 
Congress. Through it all, Guillermo Ungo of the Farabundo Marti Libera-
tion Front argued for a U.S. visa. 
It is at this juncture, where the domestic politics of the "intervenor" 
and the "intervenee" become intertwined, that, from the perspective of the 
intervenor particularly, an intervention becomes sticky. Usually this point 
is reached with the dispatching of ground combat troops. In the case of 
Central America, however, thanks to the persistent nightmare of Vietnam, 
this point has been reached in the United States much earlier. These 
external legitimacy effects are depicted in Chart 2. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article has been to provide an analytical frame-
work for answering the instrumental question about the lessons of Viet-
nam: WJiat is the optimal level of Western intervention, if any, in Marxist, 
people's wars? The approach toward an answer had been guided by the 
thesis that an insurgency is fundamentally a demonstration of a legitimacy 
crisis (as O'Neill "first" said) analytically described in the way presented 
above. Thus, the efficacy of a Western intervention must ultimately be 
judged by its impact on this crisis and not primarily in terms of the 
East-West struggle, although one must concede that this latter dimension 
cannot be entirely ruled out. Most insurgents seek outside help and if the 
insurgents are Communists, the East-West dimension will be there from 
the start. 
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From this thesis, several contentions must follow. In the domestic 
legitimacy struggle it can be contended that the key for both sides at the 
start is the legitimacy appeal of opportunity. This is the feeder mechanism 
or conduit for the appeal of ideology. It is the opportunity of cadre life for 
the insurgent or of regime access for the incumbent official that is crucial in 
persuading passive people to become actively involved on one side or the 
other. However, as Molnar argued, an insurgency gains life or staying 
power only insofar as it is able to transform its earlier cadre motivation of 
opportunity into a commitment to the cause and its ideology. Molnar's 
point is amply supported by Lucian Pye's study of guerrilla communism in 
Malaya (1956)31 and by the Rand interviews in Vietnam.32 
Regarding external legitimacy, one proposition has already been 
advanced: the danger point for the intervenor is reached when the interven-
tion becomes a divisive feature of his own domestic politics. With respect 
to the effect of an intervention on the legitimacy of the insurgency-afflicted 
society, the intervenor can readily affect legitimacy in positive ways relat-
ing to legitimacy appeals of interest and opportunity. With regard to 
interest, through commodity import programs, massive construction pro-
jects, and the like, the intervenor can help make it rational for the masses to 
stay with the government by the creation of FitzGerald's "Honda econ-
omy."33 For opportunity, the intervenor can also be of help in devising and 
financing land reform programs, in promoting elections, and in other steps 
toward improving "societal access" and "political participation" for pre-
viously blocked subgroups and social strata. 
It is at the level of ideology or belief, however, that an intervenor may 
run afoul of legitimacy and utterly negate whatever successes he may have 
achieved at lower levels. In contemplating an intervention, it is at the level 
of belief where the intervenor must assess the legitimacy of his intervention 
in an overall context and hence provide a reasonable chance of success. 
This assessment must come from a careful reading of the historical defini-
tion of national legitimacy within the society in question and a determina-
tion of the levels of intervention (for instance, at the level of ground 
combat troops) at which the legitimacy of the regime itself may be under-
mined by the scale of the intervention. In the case of Vietnam, the call of 
modern legitimacy for national independence was enhanced by a tradi-
tional obligation of a ruler to throw out foreign invaders. Despite the fact 
that a program of land reform pushed by the Americans in support of the 
government did do some good in triggering calculations of interest and 
even of opportunity for the Saigon regime, these calculations were essen-
tially reversed by the outrage engendered by the large numbers of interven-
ing foreign troops whose very presence undermined calculation of belief in 
the government's right to rule. In Malaya and Greece, however, because 
the historical duties of legitimate rule were defined quite differently, the 
legitimacy of the incumbent regimes was not adversely affected by the 
introduction of large numbers of Western combat troops. 
As a provisional lesson of Vietnam — in answer to the instrumental 
question of "What is the optimal level, if any, of Western intervention in 
Marxist, people's wars?" — one can do no better than to cite Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson's famous "missing component" press conference in 
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January 1950. His statement, in response to the criticism that the Truman 
administration "lost China," should have been heeded as a pre-lesson for 
both Vietnam and El Salvador: 
American assistance can be effective when it is the miss-
ing component in a situation which might otherwise be 
solved. The United States cannot furnish all these com-
ponents to solve the question. It cannot furnish the 
determination, it cannot furnish the will, and it cannot 
furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But if 
the will and if the determination exists and if the people 
are behind their government, then, and not always then, 
is there a very good chance. In that situation, American 
help can be effective and it can lead to an accomplishment 
which could not otherwise be achieved.34 
Acheson's words of warning, more than ten years before the first American 
advisors came to Vietnam as a "missing component," remind one, ten years 
after the collapse of South Vietnam despite as huge a number of "missing 
components" as any insurgency has ever seen, of Vietnam's most trenchant 
offspring — the lesson of legitimacy. 
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